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Cyber resilience

The Cyber Resilience Act for embedded products

What the EU Cyber Resilience Act means in engineering terms for manufacturers of embedded and connected products: scope, timeline, essential requirements and where to start.

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The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) is the first horizontal EU law that sets cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products themselves. For manufacturers of embedded devices it is not a paperwork exercise: its requirements reach into architecture, build systems, update mechanisms and the way vulnerabilities are handled after release.

This article summarises what the regulation asks for in engineering terms, and how to approach it without stopping product development.

The timeline

Date What applies
10 December 2024 The regulation enters into force
11 June 2026 Provisions on conformity assessment bodies apply
11 September 2026 Reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents
11 December 2027 All other obligations, including the essential requirements and CE marking

The reporting obligations already apply, and they apply to products already on the market, not only to new ones.

Is your product in scope?

The CRA covers products with digital elements: hardware and software whose intended use includes a direct or indirect data connection to a device or network. In practice, almost every connected embedded product is in scope.

Some product groups are excluded because sector-specific legislation already covers their cybersecurity, for example medical devices, civil aviation, marine equipment and motor vehicles covered by type approval. These exclusions are narrower than they look: an aftermarket telematics box, an EV charger or a diagnostic tool is not a type-approved vehicle.

Products in scope fall into categories that determine the conformity assessment route:

  • Default products, the large majority, can be self-assessed by the manufacturer.
  • Important products, class I (listed in Annex III, for example routers, network interfaces, operating systems and microcontrollers with security functions) can be self-assessed only when harmonised standards are applied in full; otherwise a third party is involved.
  • Important products, class II (such as firewalls, hypervisors and tamper-resistant microcontrollers) require third-party assessment.
  • Critical products (Annex IV) may require European cybersecurity certification.

What the essential requirements mean in engineering terms

Annex I has two parts: properties of the product, and how the manufacturer handles vulnerabilities. Translated into engineering work:

CRA requirement Typical engineering response
Based on a cybersecurity risk assessment Threat model maintained with the architecture, reviewed on change
No known exploitable vulnerabilities at release SBOM per release, automated CVE matching, release gate
Secure by default configuration No default passwords, minimal enabled services, documented hardening
Protection against unauthorised access Authentication, access control, secure boot and chain of trust
Confidentiality and integrity of data Encrypted and authenticated communication, protected storage
Limit the attack surface Minimal images, removed debug interfaces, least-privilege processes
Security updates Signed, fail-safe update mechanism with rollback protection
Identify and document components SBOM in a machine-readable format (SPDX, CycloneDX)
Address vulnerabilities without delay Vulnerability monitoring, triage and patch process with defined timelines
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure Published disclosure policy and a contact point

None of these are new ideas. What the CRA changes is that they become mandatory, must be documented, and must be maintained for the whole support period.

Reporting: 24 hours, 72 hours, final report

When a manufacturer becomes aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident affecting its product, it must notify through the single reporting platform operated by ENISA:

  1. an early warning within 24 hours;
  2. a notification with more detail within 72 hours;
  3. a final report, within 14 days after a corrective measure is available for a vulnerability, or within one month for an incident.

Meeting a 24-hour deadline is impossible without preparation. Someone has to be monitoring, someone has to be able to decide, and the information about which products and versions contain which components has to be available immediately. That information is the SBOM.

SBOM: the foundation of everything else

A software bill of materials lists every component in a product, including version and origin. For an embedded Linux product built with Yocto, generating SPDX documents is a build-system feature; for RTOS and bare-metal products, it usually needs dependency management that is explicit enough to be exported.

The value of the SBOM comes from automation: generated for every release, stored with the release artefacts, and continuously matched against vulnerability databases. A vulnerability report can then be answered with facts (affected products, versions and customers) rather than a search through source trees.

Updates for the support period

Manufacturers must declare a support period, which should generally be at least five years unless the product’s expected use time is shorter, and provide security updates throughout it. For embedded products this has architectural consequences:

  • an update mechanism that is signed, atomic and recoverable: A/B partitions or equivalent, with rollback protection;
  • separation of security updates from feature updates where possible;
  • an update path that works over the networks the product actually has, including constrained and intermittent links;
  • a build that can still be reproduced years later, with the same toolchain and dependencies.

Where to start

  1. Inventory and classify. List the products on the market and in development, determine scope, exclusions and category.
  2. Make reporting possible now. Set up a vulnerability contact point, a triage process and a reporting playbook. The obligation already applies.
  3. Generate SBOMs. Start with the products already shipping; integrate generation into CI.
  4. Run a gap analysis against Annex I. Prioritise the gaps that affect architecture, because they take longest to close.
  5. Build evidence into the pipeline. Risk assessment, test results and SBOMs should be produced by the development process, ready for the technical file.

The manufacturers that will find December 2027 manageable are the ones that treat the CRA as an engineering programme now, rather than a documentation project later.

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